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Taking land use seriously:
toward an ontology of municipal law
Mariana Valverde
Introduction: legal tools for local governance
That law often governs space, or governs people through space, is a
well-known fact. Although the literature on law and space and law and
geography is recent (Blomley et al 2001), municipal and quasi-municipal
authorities have for centuries now regulated activities and persons by
exercising control over access to and use of spaces  private spaces
such as pubs (Valverde 2003) and public or quasi-public spaces such as
ports, parks, roadways and sidewalks (Cooper 1998, Hermer & Mosher
2002, Webb & Webb 1906, Frug 1999, Duneier 1999).
Municipal regulations targeting spaces but acting on groups of
persons have been scrutinised in recent years, especially in the US and
Canada, by those concerned with the rights of dispossessed urban
groups. Canadian planning law, in keeping with this international trend,
has developed the doctrine that people zoning is impermissible (Hoehn
1996: 1756, Re Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba et al and City of
Winnipeg). 1 Modern zoning is said to differentiate urban space
(particularly privately owned urban space) by use, not by type of person.
And regulations concerning the use of public space (for example, rules
about permits to occupy a sidewalk, close a street temporarily, or hold a
festival in a park) also have to be person-neutral on their face.
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Critical scholars from both law and urban studies have shown that
even in those jurisdictions in which vagrancy laws and their modern
successors are constitutionally impermissible, authorities can still easily
govern both individuals and types of persons through regulations
targeting uses and activities (Waldron 1991, Waldron 2000, Blomley
2004, Hermer & Mosher 2002). Much energy has thus been devoted to
showing  both in the scholarly literature and in certain court challenges
 that uses, spaces and activities are somewhat devious means to
the old social-control end of regulating the poor.
From the point of view of experience, it may not matter at all whether
one is being kicked out of a park because one is defined as a vagrant or
because there is a bylaw of general application that bans sleeping on
park benches. However, understanding the workings of law in their
specificity is important, both intellectually and politically. Intellectually,
it is high time that critical legal scholarship developed an understanding
of law that eschews neo-Marxist structural stories in which the only
question is whether the rich come out ahead. The rich are not all one
group, and understanding conflicts among sectors of the bourgeoisie
is crucial; but more importantly, even when the rich do come out ahead,
how exactly they manage to come out ahead in a particular legal arena
is a matter for the careful empirical documentation and concrete analysis
of the how of governance that is so often neglected in structuraliststyle analysis of the why.
Politically too, if one is going to launch effective legal and political
strategies to counteract some of the exclusionary moves that many
contemporary cities have undertaken in recent years, we need to
understand that municipal law has certain logics that are not unique but
nevertheless characteristic of local governance. Activists and lawyers
used to nation-wide struggles around constitutional rights need to
understand that local struggles in which the legal funnel for political
and social disputes is local law take place on a specific terrain that is
quite distinct and much less well known than the arena of federal
constitutional rights.
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Blackletter lawyers (and planners) would say that the difference
between the local and the big law of the constitutional arena is that
local government governs property. There is certainly truth in the
blackletter story: historically, local government has mainly organised
public and regulated private property, relying on property taxes to do
so. This has led to constructing local citizenship as a function of property,
even if in the current day mere residency is sufficient to grant some
notional property rights (for example, in the form of standing for purposes
of planning and zoning).
Property is in turn usually defined in terms of access to material
resources. Law students know that property includes entities such as
easements and air rights, and of course also very abstract economic
entities. But generally, municipal law and planning practitioners think
about municipal law and policy as revolving, in the last instance, around
access to, control over, and enjoyment of spaces, buildings, parcels
of land, and other largely material entities. This privileging of physically
and geographically constituted entities is re-enacted every day in the
visualisation practices of planning discussions and zoning hearings 
meetings which are always awash in maps, photographs of buildings
and streets, architectural drawings, and other visual formats that
privilege space and matter rather than people.
My argument here is not, however, that space really matters and
that legal scholars should drop what they are doing and read the literature
on space. My argument is, instead, that local law and governance is not
usefully differentiated from other juridical fields by deploying the things
vs persons, nonhuman vs human binary. Actor-network scholars, Bruno
Latour in particular (1987, 1993) have opened our eyes to the fruitfulness
of an approach that begins by refusing to draw an ontological line
separating nature from culture, things from people, objects from subjects.
Latours work can, I argue, be adapted by legal scholars, in the first
instance to help us to deconstruct the old textbook division between
the law of persons and the law of things. Needless to say, critical
scholarship has long challenged this binary: but, overwhelmingly, critical
legal scholars deconstruct the binary only in one direction, namely by

36

Taking land use seriously

showing that legal tools designed to govern things, uses, and activities
usually end up governing certain groups of persons (for example, those
who are homeless). One of the most eminent critical scholars of planning,
Peter Hall, typically introduces the history of zoning by mentioning
early deployments of zoning bylaws aimed at getting rid of Chinese
laundries and Jewish garment workers (Hall 1988, 2002: 58).This oneway deconstruction, however, has the effect of erasing the specificity
of municipal legal and policy tools: it makes zoning bylaws seem
essentially identical to criminal statutes (for example, the old vagrancy
laws, always invoked in critical urban scholarship). The city councils
that used zoning to get rid of Chinese laundries were clearly just as
racist as the immigration authorities that imposed head taxes, but saying
this does not help us to understand the specificity of local governance.
Municipal law certainly governs persons, and even specific groups
of persons, and not only dispossessed or marginal groups: but it does
so in a different manner than the criminal law or constitutional rights
law. Local authorities govern persons as well as pieces of land and
buildings, but they generally avoid governing through the category of
person that is so central to liberal governance and hence to law.
Municipal rules and regulations generally govern through categories,
such as use and activity, that are somewhat removed from personhood
partly because they also, and most importantly, simultaneously, govern
spaces and things (nonhumans). Governing people, things, and spaces
through use is a different kind of governmental operation than the
much better known operation of governing through legal categories of
personhood and group identity.
The resources of actor-network (ANT) approaches are particularly
useful in the study of municipal law, since ANT studies begin by
sidelining that central traditional liberal legal category (person) and
treating all actors in a network as presumptively on the same plane.
From an ANT perspective, a building, the person owning the building,
a drawing of the building, a lawyer making an argument about the
building, and a court decision in regard to the building are all actors,
whose relative weight in a particular network is a matter for documentation
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(Riles 2000, Pottage & Mundy 2003, Valverde 2005). Or to put it
differently, from a network point of view, the old neo-Marxist argument
to the effect that regulations about uses and spaces are really just
covert ways of regulating persons loses some of its appeal. Of course
persons are part of all legal networks: but so are sidewalks, streetcars,
and the numerous pieces of paper used in the adjudication process.
Use (as in land use, but not limited to planning law) is a legal
technology that constitutes a network that includes inanimate objects,
spaces, property relations, persons, trees and plants, and other entities,
but without privileging persons.

Governing through uses
Land use is of course specific to planning: but use is a much more
widely disseminated legal concept. At the local level, use is an
absolutely crucial legal technology, whose effects are best understood
if we contrast governing through use to governing through persons.
One difference with crucial political effects is that while the governance
of persons through law has in recent decades undergone a number of
changes increasing due process rights and antidiscrimination protection,
uses, unlike persons, are not rights bearers at all. Changes in such areas
as planning law thus proceed from causes other than political changes
in rights consciousness or rights allocations. For example, it is now
common for planners to support mixed-use developments (condos above
shops, live-work units, etc), since the strict separation of land uses that
gave us the dreary shopless and publess residential streets of the 1950s
and 1960s is now unfashionable. But this change, through which uses
formerly thought incompatible are brought closer together, has nothing
to do with any democratic vision of pluralism, people mixing, or
empowerment of the dispossessed (uses). Studying municipal law
reveals that events and processes that hinge on use governance (e.g.
the ability of disabled or homeless people to live in group homes that
are zoned differently from conventional family homes) do not today
proceed any more democratically than in the past.

38

Taking land use seriously

An example from my ongoing research into urban law in action may
help here. In the city of Toronto there was recently a bitter fight, lasting
for about five years, concerning the bylaw requiring a 250-meter
separation distance between shelters for homeless persons. The
separation rule was challenged by advocates who used this little detail
as the occasion to engage in an all-out political struggle about poverty,
homelessness, and social rights in urban space. Ordinarily, anyone
wanting to just put up one particular shelter close to another would
seek only a suspension of the rule (a zoning variance). Variances are
routinely granted through a process that is crucial to the relatively
smooth governance of urban order. But suspending such rules can
only be done one site at the time, through laborious and expensive
public consultation processes that give middle-class homeowners
inordinate power to effect denials of zoning variances, even small
variances that are very similar to those that are routinely granted for
less socially contentious uses.2
In the event, the almost final authority on all local zoning matters,
the Ontario Municipal Board, decided to ease the separation distance
restrictions imposed on the shelters in order to make it somewhat easier
to build or renovate for shelter purposes. This responded to the socially
progressive dimension of local Toronto politics  but without quite
meeting the demands of the housing advocates, or otherwise radically
challenging the vocal elements that cried out in favour of exclusionary
measures. And legally, this compromise solution was fully in keeping
with the practice of zoning law, since minor adjustments are often
demanded (by the OMB or by city council or city planners) more because
of their politically pacifying effects than because the adjustements are
particularly good in strict planning terms.
Within what ANT would call the network of planning/zoning, it was
thus possible to obtain a minor change making life somewhat easier for
the citys shelter operators. By contrast, a simultaneous attempt by
housing advocates to shift feet and move the struggle onto the terrain
of persons, through a constitutional challenge arguing that the whole
bylaw discriminated against an identifiable group (homeless people)
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did not even get off the ground. The OMB panel stated that they had
no jurisdiction over constitutional issues  which is certainly correct,
the OMB being set up specifically to adjudicate planning disputes: but
they offered the gratuitous comment that if they did have such
jurisdiction, they would have found the claim baseless. The bylaw, the
OMB found, does not discriminate at all, since there is no distinction
based on personal characteristics any person may access the facilities
if they find themselves homeless (OMB 2004: 49).
The attempt to circumvent the relatively self-contained network of
planning law by recourse to big law thus failed miserably. It is
nevertheless important to note that although the result was predictable,
given the OMBs jurisprudence (Chipman 2004), it was not completely
a foregone conclusion. Rights claims can sometimes be effectively made
within legal networks concerned with use. If a court (rather than an
administrative tribunal) had heard the challenge, it is possible that such
a court would have found (as the Manitoba Court of Appeal did in the
Alcoholism Foundation case) that there was a breach of Charter rights,
in the laws effects if not on its face.
However, it is more likely that a court would simply defer to the
OMBs interpretation of the shelter bylaw  given courts traditional
deference to expert tribunals  and thus let stand an interpretation
that harmed the interests of homeless persons by defining their refuges
as non-housing.
Whatever the legal future of this or similar cases, the point is that
arguments about persons and their rights can only be brought in as a
wholly external limit on regulations regarding uses. Such external limits
are necessarily very exceptional and require much legal and political
work. And adjudicative arenas used to haggling about building heights,
slight variations in density, and minor exceptions to rules regarding use
are probably the worst possible forums to which one could bring
constitutional challenges whose currency is persons and their abstract
absolute rights. Given the strict limitations on judicial review of municipal
and provincial/state decisions, it is very difficult to translate local issues
that begin as fights about uses into legal currency valid in the big law
networks.
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By and large, municipal authorities regulate both people and spaces
with legal tools whose logics are incommensurable with the logic of
rights  and with the broader logic of personhood that underlies the
legal apparatus of rights. This is apparent even in one of the very few
decisions that does set an external limit on the use-driven practices of
local governance, namely the Alcoholism Foundation decision, which
demanded that the city of Winnipeg rewrite its group-home zoning
bylaws to ensure that Charter rights are not infringed. Even in that case,
the judge insisted on keeping the logic of local governance in a separate
universe from the world of rights. He stated that federal and provincial
governments have all sorts of laws and policies designed to meet the
needs of disabled and disadvantaged people for whom group homes
and other institutional uses are intended, but added that these policies,
despite their location in higher levels of government, are quite irrelevant
for local law purposes: The purposes of objectives of the provincial
legislation [on disability rights] ... are totally different from the purposes
and objectives of the City of Winnipeg in attempting to zone land use
as it did. In case the incommensurability of the legal networks was still
unclear, he repeated: There is absolutely no relation between what the
city has been doing and what the province has to do under specific
legislation (703).
How is it that local use-based governance can so peremptorily be
said to be separate from and not accountable to the dictates of higher
levels of government about disability rights and so forth? It seems to
me that the naturalisation of the legal invention of land use in early
zoning law (starting in the 1910s) makes it easy for the illiberal (or more
accurately, nonliberal) governance of things and persons through land
use to go largely unquestioned and even unnoticed, except perhaps
by a few practising lawyers. The homeless shelter bylaw mentioned
above, for example, was publicised far and wide by activists as an attack
on the rights of homeless persons; but little was said in the voluminous
record of public debates about something that was legally much more
central to the case, namely, the fact that in order to be subjected to
quasi-industrial rules about separation and so forth, shelters had to be
defined as non-housing  that is, as an institutional rather than
residential use.
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Redefining shelters as housing for zoning purposes might have
been a much more fruitful and effective legal strategy than raising a
constitutional challenge, in part because such a change could be effected
outside of the courts, simply through a city council and/or provincial
Ministry of Municipal Affairs decision. But while considerable political
energy could be mustered, inside city council and outside of it, on
behalf of the homeless as persons,3 the more tactically appropriate
attempt to redefine shelters as housing received no attention in the city
council debates, being found only among the arguments of the lawyers
for the housing advocacy groups.
I do not wish to claim that urban/local law is unique in slipping
easily from persons to things via uses. The criminal law too is not
simply a network of persons: it is fundamentally interested in ensuring
security and minimising future disorder, perhaps more than in punishing
persons as such. But the point is that the criminal law can only act upon
future risks by acting on persons, through their acts. Land-use law
seeks to minimise economic and aesthetic disutilities, thus working to
produce order in ways that are compatible with the long term aims of the
criminal law: but it does not work upon the future by acting on persons.
And, contrary to planning law doctrine, neither does land-use law
generally act on property as such (except in rare cases, such as
expropriation). Rather, land-use law generally acts (as its name indicates)
on the use made of the property. This sets up an ontology of governance
with distinct features  although admittedly, governing through use is
not unique to planning law. Elsewhere in the local realm, a variety of
regulations aimed at ensuring order in public space  park regulations,
for example  also govern people, property, and space through use.
Use is not a strictly legal term, of course: but nevertheless, when it
becomes a key legal technology it has specific meanings and does
specific work (just like person, also a nonlegal category with a specific
legal genealogy). Urban studies scholars and legal historians who have
documented the rise of use-based legal tools (such as planning and
zoning law) have largely taken the category for granted, as if uses
were intrinsic characteristics of buildings and sidewalks and parks like
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mass, colour, and density. There are plenty of disputes among planners
and urban studies specialists about how exactly to differentiate between
residential and commercial uses; but such disputes presuppose and
thus tend to reify the basic category of use. Now, I cannot here
undertake a full genealogy of use in law, or even in one area of law: but
I can offer some observations that may help to open the blackbox of
use, with particular attention to land use.
Latours studies of particular scientific black boxes often take the
reader back to the time when a technique or a fact was being discovered
and challenged. Similarly, it is useful at this juncture to look back at
texts located at the beginning of the project to govern urban space
through zoning, a time when zoning and use were new ideas still in
need of explanation and justification. One such text is an early Canadian
plea for a more modern urban law. The author was Noulan Cauchon, the
city of Ottawas main planner and a leading promoter of town planning
across Canada. Stating what by the 1950s and 1960s would no longer
need to be stated, Mr Cauchon tells us that planning is the scientific
and orderly disposition of land and buildings in use and development
(1923: 3). This definition puts zoning fully on the side of nonhumans,
but it would be no revelation to Mr Cauchon to add that zoning, which
until the 1960s remained the practical core of municipal planning in
Canada, does not merely distribute physical things and spaces. Cauchon
himself says as much. In keeping with the British literature on planning
of the time, planning/zoning is said in this Canadian text to have three
purposes and rationalities. These are: 1) health (in the public health
sense); 2) efficiency; and 3) amenity. That all of these reach far
beyond the mere distribution of things in space was evident to urban
planners of the time, who anticipated that human happiness would
more or less automatically increase if land and buildings were arranged
properly (Perks & Jamieson 1991, Artibise & Shelter 1979, Gerecke 1976).
The first two of Cauchons rationalities of planning, public health
and national efficiency, were the basic rationalities of Canadian postWorld War I governance across all levels of government and all
governing sites, and they were explicitly inclusive of humans as well as
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nonhumans (as the extensive discussions of human and natural
resources prompted by the national Commission of Conservation,
Canadas first planning think-tank, show).4 In that sense there is nothing
specific about planning or indeed about local as opposed to national
governance in the two first rationalities mentioned. Thus, special
importance attaches to Mr Cauchons third town-planning objective
and target, the only one that is specific to municipal law, namely
amenity.5

Human and nonhuman: amenity
What did Cauchon mean by amenity?
In Cauchons long list of the types of businesses that need to be
governed through zoning there are many whose inclusion under the
zoning banner is justified through health and efficiency  pollutionemitting factories, railways, etc. Health and efficiency are tried and true
ways of governing persons and spaces through the category of
population, as the vast literature on biopolitical state projects
demonstrates. But what is of particular interest in Cauchons list is that
there are some uses that are legally governed through zoning, but
without the biopolitical rationales of health and efficiency being
involved. One such business use is undertaking establishments. These
do not pollute or cause traffic congestion. No biopolitical rationale
would justify subjecting these to special separation requirements.
Nevertheless, they ought to be regulated as if they were hazardous 
because they cause distress. (Hospitals too cause distress, as well
as traffic, though we are not told if this is because the sight of hospitals
reminds passsersby of illness and death.) The presence of funeral homes
distresses passersby and thus reduces the amenity of the immediate
neighbourhood. It is hence clear that amenity is something more than a
biopolitical objective; it is also not reducible to an economic rationale,
since there is no reason to think that hospitals and funeral parlours
lower the value of surrounding homes.
Amenity is a wonderfully multivalent and heterogeneous category.
Like many other terms in municipal law (for example, blight,
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improvement [Valverde 2005]), amenity encompasses physical and
economic as well as cultural relations in one fell swoop, by quietly
sidelining discussions about causation and about utility. Amenity
has a family resemblance to the extremely capacious notion of
conservation deployed by the short-lived Canadian Commission of
Conservation: the Commission too erased the usual distinctions
separating economic prosperity, public health, individual health,
patriotism, and aesthetic values. Not surprisingly, given the complexity
of the assemblage of purposes and rationalities that lurks under this
word, amenity allowed and continues to allow municipalities to govern
people  and relations of class, ethnicity, and respectability  without
governing through persons.
While the 1920s notion of national conservation has long
disappeared, amenity continues to allow and justify governance that
does not respect conventional ontological distinctions. Today, in
Toronto and other North American cities, planner-produced discourse
assumes that special sidewalk treatments, pedestrian level lighting,
and sidewalk trees are concrete ways of rendering amenity visible and
effective. There is a strong implication that this also increases the
happiness of the people who live or work there, in keeping with the 19th
century notion that architectural improvements would act directly upon
the souls of urban dwellers. And yet, it would not be accurate to regard
amenity simply as a covert way of governing persons. Amenity is
connected to but is not quite the same as peoples personal happiness.
This is apparent in the ambiguous wording of the Ontario Planning
Act (1983). The statute states that the purpose of a zoning bylaw is to
control the use of land to provide for the amenity of the area within the
councils jurisdiction and for the health, safety, and general welfare of
the inhabitants of the municipality. The and suggests that the amenity
of the area is not the same as the health and safety of the people in it.
Although amenity is linked to peoples welfare  in a rather
indeterminate manner  it is nevertheless somewhat disembodied, since
it is not identical or even coterminous with human welfare. It is the area
that has the amenity, not the persons  although in the process of
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adjudicating amenity, the enjoyment and satisfaction of the persons in
it figure very prominently.6 In zoning hearings I have attended, amenity
is routinely said to be calculable merely from looking at plans and
drawings that contain no images of persons or any references to actual
or hypothetical residents7. In this way one slides from bricks and trees
to human happiness in a vertiginously speedy manner, without any
intermediaries.
Amenity is not a 20th century invention. The word was found in the
legal technologies that governed land use before zoning was invented
(for example, restrictive covenants and nuisance lawsuits). Like other
rationalities of property and civil law, it seems to have been imported
into modern zoning law without much discussion. One scholar tells us
that the concept of amenity was very powerful in late Victorian times,
and seems to have been used in much the same spirit as quality of life
is today. In its urban planning sense, amenity has been described as
meaning the provision of a good environment for the promotion of a
healthy and civilized life (P Smith 1979: 220).
Now, a humanist, modernist scholar, such as Pierre Bourdieu, would
object that in the end, in the last instance, it is people (or class fractions)
who are being regulated and excluded: he would say that amenity is
simply a vehicle to convey the cultural preferences of a particular
socioeconomic sector so as to govern persons through classes and
classes through persons and their habitus. Along similar lines,
progressive urban studies writers such as Neil Smith and Mike Davis
(N Smith 1996, Davis 1994) spend much time showing that architectural
designs and bylaws about the use of space are nothing but vehicles of
upper- middle-class hegemony, in keeping with this neo-Marxist
approach.
This approach is certainly useful, and has been repeatedly deployed
to document the effects on persons and social classes of various urban
legal technologies, at the level of sociological effects. And yet, if we are
going to understand how urban legal mechanisms today are different
from Elizabethan vagrancy laws  if we are going to analyse legal
mechanisms in some detail, instead of reducing them to mere effects of
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socioeconomic structures, as is generally done in the critical urban
studies literature  it is important to grasp how governing urban
problems through lists of activities, utilities, and uses is not quite the
same as governing through categories of persons.
One final example will illustrate the incommensurability of use-based
and person-based governance. In February 2005, the city of Toronto
passed an amendment to the bylaw governing Nathan Phillips square
(a large, mostly empty space in front of and around City Hall) to ban
sleeping. The hours of heated discussion on the bylaw made it very
clear that councillors were not really wanting to govern use. One
councillor said that lawyers taking a break from their cases at the nearby
Court of Appeal and falling asleep on a bench would not be prosecuted
for breaking the bylaw.8 The target was quite specific: a group of
homeless people, said to consist of only about 14 individuals, who
according to city officials, persisted in sleeping overnight in the square
despite municipal efforts to get them to sleep in the newly opened
municipal shelter nearby.9 (The square had previously been used as a
nighttime refuge by larger numbers of homeless persons, but most of
them took advantage of a new nearby shelter when it opened in the fall
of 2004).10
It is tempting to focus analytical attention only on the antisleeping
amendment to conclude that we now see a return to old vagrancy laws.
Neo-Marxist urban studies (and most existing political activism on behalf
of homeless and other marginalised persons) has alerted us to the effects
of legal and urban-design technologies on certain groups of persons,
and this amendment is almost a perfect case in point. But while this
perspective is necessary politically, it is also important to see that
providing a functionalist explanation that always talks about excluding
or controlling persons of a certain type does not suffice as an analysis,
especially as an analysis of the more routine processes of local
governance. Direct targeting of persons is nowadays quite unusual. I
would argue that the reason why hundreds of people, including myself,
gave up the better part of a working day to go and intervene in the
council debate was precisely that this plan to coercively govern a specific
group of persons is, for Toronto, today, a cruel and unusual use of
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municipal bylaws. To study everyday local legal governance seriously,
one cannot focus exclusively on occasional high-profile campaigns, as
is generally done by critical scholars who have documented how the
homeless were booted out of Peoples Park in Berkely or how Times
Square was gentrified. I argue that one has to study the everyday
processes of governance, the taken for granted background against
which a large number of citizens (including myself in my participant
role) found the new bylaw amendment appalling.
Some of the background is that residents of the city know that
homeless persons regularly sleep on Torontos squares and sidewalks.
In the mid-1990s, when a viciously neoconservative provincial
govenment cut the welfare rates drastically, homelessness became a
sudden crisis  but in subsequent years the mere presence of
panhandlers and people sleeping in parks has become routinised.
Generally, visibly indigent people are tolerated (more or less grudgingly)
by both officials and the public. Occasional campaigns by right-wing
politicians create waves on this surface, but studying these or politically
intervening in them does not reveal much about the everyday governance
of the marginal.
It is quite telling, I think, that the city has an elaborate protocol
instructing their employees how to move to one side belongings
pertaining to homeless persons if when they are cleaning the sidewalk
the owner is not present. The protocol sets out, in a neutral bureaucratic
style, the exact steps to be taken when homeless persons need to reclaim
belongings that appear to have been abandoned and that are put into
storage by city workers. This routinises the interaction between officials
and homeless people in a rather different way than the antisleeping City
Hall Square bylaw amendment. Homeless persons might find that their
belongings have been seized, but there is a clearly laid out (if
bothersome) process to reclaim them. Critical scholars who focus their
attention on particular campaigns of social exclusion need to remember
that this low-key protocol, which, however reluctantly, admits the
homeless into the circle of citizenship, is more typical of the day to day
work of bylaw enforcement than the largely symbolic antisleeping
amendment just discussed.
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Further to the normalisation of homelessness, a well-established
program, Out of the Cold, provides sleeping bags to all who want and
need them. These bags, which are often abandoned (especially when it
rains) to be later picked up by program volunteers to dry clean them for
re-use, act as powerful messages informing daytime passersby of what
goes on under cover of darkness in numerous downtown locations.
This program too governs homelessness in a manner that does not
justify the new vagrancy reading of current urban policy.
Corroborating my analysis of the importance of locating occasional
outbursts of exclusionary politics within the context of the more
established and more politically ambiguous everyday processes for
governing the homeless population is the fact that about six months
after the amendment was passed, it appears that no charges under the
new bylaw amendment had been laid. The regular coverage of
homelessness issues provided in The Toronto Star indicates that from
February to August, the city carried out a fairly intensive, partly
successful campaign to persuade/coerce homeless persons to accept
living in cheap rooming houses. The coverage does not mention any
bylaw charges being brought against any of the people, some of whom
have lived for years under bridges, who in the summer of 2005 were
being slowly housed through a combination of compassion and
pressure, exerted by the citys newly hired 11 outreach workers.11
Homelessness activists also stated that they did not know of any charges
under the much-debated antisleeping amendment.
While studying and criticising the antisleeping amendment is
certainly worthwhile, more typical of Torontos everyday processes of
governance, I would argue, and possibly illustrative of broader patterns
in municipal governance, is the regulatory work provided in the old,
unamended Nathan Phillips Square bylaw, which nobody mentioned in
the debates about its amendment.
The text of Toronto Bylaw No 1994-0784 reveals a truly Benthamite
series of restrictions and prohibitions  few of which seem to have a
specific social or political group as their target. These prohibitions
remained politically invisible throughout the debate on the antisleeping
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amendment. Perhaps the activists and homeless persons present at
City Hall did not know about the existing bylaw; but city councillors
undoubtedly did, since the motion before them was an amendment to it.
Be that as it may, what is very different about the old bylaw (by
comparison with the amendment) is that the majority of its provisions
do not target any particular group, that is, they do not govern persons
as persons.
Releasing helium balloons is prohibited; so is speaking through a
megaphone without a permit; so is being on skates anywhere except on
the skating rink. Skateboarding is of course also banned, as is climbing
trees (though there are hardly any trees to climb). Selling anything
(except newspapers) is prohibited except by special occasion permit;
and occasional vendors operating under a permit are subject to lengthy
rules about the size, location, and physical character of their stalls.
Setting off fireworks is banned, as is throwing anything (including
pennies) in the reflecting pool. Riding a bicycle is also prohibited, even
though the city provides a temptingly large number of bike parking
spots in the square itself.
These are not idle prohibitions. My ongoing empirical research on
bylaw enforcement has not yet shed much light on the policing of
Nathan Phillips square, but (when arriving to interview a city official in
charge of bylaw enforcement, ironically) I was once stopped by a city
employee and given a warning as I parked my bike in the place provided.
The warning about the bylaw was due to the fact that I had not walked
my bike the whole way through the vast expanse of unadorned and
treeless concrete that makes up most of the square.
Continuing with the text of the bylaw, we find that it is also forbidden
to present or take part in any dramatic, musical, artistic or other
performance. Curiously, however, poetry reading is said not to be a
performance, which means one can recite poetry in the square, but not
sing. A rather politically remarkable fact is that holding a demonstration
in Torontos premier public space requires a permit. And, more relevant
to the case at hand, camping is explicitly banned: it is forbidden to
camp or erect or place a tent or temporary abode of any kind. (This last
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bit shows that there was little legal point in passing the special
antisleeping clause, since  especially in February of 2005, when
temperatures were unusually cold, around 20 degrees Celsius below
freezing one cannot merely sleep outdoors, one has to have at least
a sleeping bag and some cardboard).
The bylaw as a whole, then, envisions a totally disciplined urban
space in which practically anything other than sedate walking is
prohibited. The particular space that is city hall square undoubtedly
owes something of its austereness to the cultural preferences arising
out of Torontos Protestant past: but today, when half of Torontos
residents have been born outside of Canada, culturalist explanations
are less useful than ever. The order of the square (the lack of any nonpermitted activity except winter-time skating in the ice rink) is reproduced
every day mainly by rules that, unlike the antisleeping amendment, are
not obviously targeting a specific group. Nobody can hold a
demonstration and shout slogans through a microphone without a
permit; no business can operate in the square; and so on.
So, let us now finally ask, what is this thing called a use, this entity
that does so much work in the governance of urban space and urban
life? One important clue to the ontology of use is that, from the very
beginning of zoning law, the adjective most frequently attached to use
is incompatible (Fischler 1998, Platt 1991). Let us also note that the
doctrine of incompatibility is not exclusive to zoning: the governance
of sidewalks and roadways is also characterised by processes in which
different uses can only be brought together as an exception, by means
of bureucratic permits that are not easy to obtain. (The very strict
permitting of street and subway musicians and the tight restrictions on
street vending are examples of this general logic.) While my research on
the governance of sidewalks and streets is still at a very preliminary
stage, it is not premature to state that the whole history of municipal law
is built on a single premise about uses: namely, that different uses of the
same urban space are presumptively incompatible.
It may be that the very term use only began to be employed in
those situations, such as New York City in the 1910s, in which there
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were heated struggles about who and what ought to be given priority in
the arrangement of prime urban spaces, both private and public (Fischler
1998, Hall 1988). It may well be that people did not think of selling fruit
on the sidewalk, riding a bike, and singing as uses until some citizens
began to object to these traditional practices. However it developed, it
is clear that the notion of land-use (together with its associated lexicon,
which includes amenity, improvement and highest and best use)
soon acquired a certain facticity, an air of solidity.
The connection between use and physical space helped in this
reification process. To state that factory uses are incompatible with
upscale residential and shopping uses is to make an apparently empirical
statement, one that is formally homologous with the claim that railways
and cars cannot use the same corridors. By talking about incompatible
uses one forgets that subways and trains cannot physically travel along
streets, while, by contrast, there are no physical barriers to shopping
and sleeping being done in the same space; the barriers are normative
and legal.
The religion of incompatible land uses that was codified in the 1916
New York City zoning ordinance and borrowed all around North America,
including in Toronto, has been modified in recent years. Today we are
seeing a retreat from the strict incompatibility thesis of the 1950s70s,
through which residents of countless North American and English cities
were deprived of stores and leisure spaces within walking distance. But
the post-Jane Jacobs Europhile integration of commercial and residential
uses that one sees in fashionable downtown regeneration projects is
still tentative and exceptional. First, the mixing seems to go only one
way. As Nick Blomley has pointed out in his recent study of property
law in action in Vancouver, mixed-use tends to be deployed to justify
architectural and legal changes facilitating middle- and upper-class
households moving into and renovating previously working-class
properties (Blomley 2004). Allowing the new self-employed petty
bourgeoisie to conduct their (non-blue collar) business from a loft that
is classed residential but is located above a shop does modify the
incompatible uses religion  in one direction; but it by no means
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abolishes it. Shelters for battered women and noisy auto-repair shops
will not be able to take advantage of the mixed-use rationality to locate
themselves in upper-crust areas.
Secondly, even in its limited one-way form, mixed uses generally
require some declaration of exceptionality. Following the American
invention of Business Improvement Districts, Toronto too developed
a special classification for old downtown areas (some formerly industrial
and some occupied by discount stores and other cheap uses).
Declaring an area to be a Business Improvement Area allows for a number
of exceptions to the usual zoning and planning rules (for example, higher
densities, easier expropriations, involvement of private sector interests
in street design and landscaping as well as in street security, etc).
Hence, mixed-use is not a logic that is being applied consistently
and thoroughly around the urban sphere. It is deployed as an exceptional
measure, even if more and more downtown districts, in post-industrial
formerly blue-collar sections of old cities, are falling under the
exceptional category and are being accordingly gentrified. But even if
we see the extension of mixed-use planning principles to more and more
areas of the city, it is highly doubtful that the uses will be mixed in both
directions of the social/economic spectrum.
The reason why I predict that mixing uses will remain one-directional
and somewhat exceptional is that, as those fighting for supportive
housing in the city of Toronto and elsewhere in North America know,
uses have no rights. And in local governance, turning an old home or a
disused factory into a shelter is considered a question of uses, not a
question of persons. This means that instead of clearly setting out a
case about persons (for example, battered women, mentally challenged
adults, etc) and their equal right to the city in order to mobilise resources,
one has to engage in endless petty fights about uses  parking spots,
densities, green spaces and elevations. The production and circulation
of these entities needs to be carefully analysed, instead of being
dismissed simply as stand-ins for types of persons.
Claims about persons and their rights can occasionally trump and
negate some deployments of the power to order space that in the US is
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called the police power (for example, in the US strip clubs have been
able to contest some zoning regulations on the basis that stripping is a
form of speech and thus subject to constitutional protection). But such
external limits will necessarily remain exceptional, since they do not
affect the bulk of use-based law or challenge its logic.
Arguments seeking to realise democratic inclusionary strategies
could perhaps be found that stay within the less humanist, more
pragmatic field of uses. Seeking to redefine group homes as housing,
as suggested in the first example given in the paper, does not satisfy
radical lawyers yearning to make constitutional history, but it could be
more effective in terms of actually getting more supportive housing
built  as well as serving, at the academic level, to explore forms of
critical legal thought that go beyond the human/nonhuman binary.
Governing urban life through uses constitutes a certain terrain
and sets out the parameters of the battles that can take place there. We
should be able to devise ways to fight on that terrain; I do not see that
deploying the liberal fiction of the person with rights is necessarily
the only, or even the best, political move one can make when faced with
use regulations that have socially exclusionary effects.

Conclusion: toward a parliament of uses?
In imagining a world in which the binary opposition of things and
persons would be critically challenged, Bruno Latour famously asked
his readers to imagine re-making the modern constitution (that is, the
separation of things from people, nature from culture) through the
convening of a parliament of things (1993: 1445). I have made a
somewhat different argument here, since I have throughout emphasised
that uses govern things and people simultaneously. I am thus not
wanting to emphasise the things side of the binary or to repeat that
space is important in and for law. Rather, I want to underline the
complexity of the task of understanding (and possibly revising) legal
mechanisms that have always already deconstructed the things/persons
binary.
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At the end of The Order of Things, Foucault imagined that perhaps
the figure of Man, like a drawing made in the seaside sand, was
beginning to wash out. It has become apparent, however, that the work
of imposing order on the modern world does not necessarily require
governing through Man  the literature on space and law is ample
proof of that. But neither legal humanism (such as that embodied in
radical lawyers attempt to introduce constitutional rights challenges
into legal networks not suited to person-based claims) nor abstractions
about space in general (for example, Lefebvre 1991) help much in
understanding the working logics of certain very familiar and yet poorly
understood forms of legal governance. Bruno Latours deliberately
provocative notion of a parliament of things could perhaps be borrowed
in imagining a parliament of uses  and parliaments of other entities
that are neither persons nor things, neither cultural nor material, or more
accurately both.
Whether using Latours work or other resources for analysis, it
should be possible to experiment with ways of working toward forms of
governing (through use, through persons, or through anything else)
that have more democratic effects than what we now have, at all political
and legal levels. Intellectually, meanwhile, paying serious attention to
taken-for-granted terms (amenity, use, etc) and noting how they are
deployed in everyday legal governance may prove more useful than
any amount of conventional theorising.

Notes
1

The ban on people zoning is extremely weak, however. This weakness is
illustrated in the key cases concerning one dimension of people zoning,
namely, the restriction of certain urban spaces to family (usually defined
by blood and marriage). The Alcoholism Foundation involved an appeal by
several organisations providing supportive housing in group home settings
to a Winnipeg zoning bylaw that, like other similar bylaws around the
country and in the US, differentiated group homes from family dwellings,
imposing requirements on the former  primarily, separation distances 
that make it onerous to provide the kind of housing in question. The
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Manitoba Court of Appeal very reluctantly granted that given Supreme
Court jurisprudence on discrimination, the Winnipeg bylaw had to be struck
down, but the court intimated that it would be easy for municipal lawyers
to Charter-proof zoning bylaws accomplishing the same purpose but not
so clearly targeting identifiable groups (the disabled or other special-needs
persons in supportive group homes). In a similar case, involving a zoning
bylaw distinguishing between family and non-family occupiers of second
suites (basement apartments), the British Columbia Court of Appeal
overturned a lower court decision that had found the municipal discrimination
against non-family occupiers to be ultra vires (Faminow v Corporation of
District of North Vancouver). The lower court decision is a ringing indictment
of people zoning, but one that was cut off on appeal.
2

This process is common across North America, being generally based on
the original New York City zoning bylaw developed during World War I
(Hall 1988: 58ff). The New York City Board of Zoning Appeals was the
original inspiration for similar bodies across North America,e.g. the
Committees of Adjustment of the city of Toronto. Little empirical research
exists on zoning appeals/variances processes, but my own research in
Toronto suggests that a large part of the citys built form consists of
exceptions  for example, buildings and uses that pre-existed the bylaw
and buildings (and uses) that obtained legal exceptions. Both of these legally
ghostly forms of life are included under the interestingly liminal category of
legal nonconforming use.

3

This statement is based on a reading of all the relevant City Council debates
and the coverage of the protracted dispute about the bylaw in the Toronto
Star.

4

Mixing humans and nonhumans in a way that would later become
unfashionable, and is described by historian Paul Rutherford as strange
(1971: 215), the Commission of Conservation was concerned both with the
conservation of natural resources such as forests and fresh water and the
conservation and maximisation of human resources through selective
immigration and other means.

5

Paul Rabinows excellent study of modernist colonial town planning in
French North Africa demonstrates that, in settings governed directly from
a far-away metropolitan centre, town planning can exhibit the same logic as
national projects of colonisation and acculturation (1989). In early Canadian
cities too one sees certain colonial, national, and imperial logics of governance
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at work in urban as well as rural settings. The kind of governance
accomplished through todays zoning bylaws and similar legal tools is thus
not coterminous with the local as such. In other words, the differences
between local law and governance and big law outlined in this paper have
little or nothing to do with scale.
6

Davina Cooper has recently alerted sociolegal scholars about the need to
further investigate the curious category of enjoyment that is central to
nuisance law (2002). Like amenity, enjoyment links persons and things
quietly and silently, since only persons can enjoy; but in nuisance law as in
other areas of municipal governance, persons enjoyment is not quite the
same as the joy of rights, since enjoyment is always mediated by place and
is furthermore often conditional on owning the place in question (enjoyment
of ones property being the operative term). Nuisance law would be a
fruitful arena for ANT-style analyses, given the notorious ontological
hybridity of typical nuisances, such as loud/offensive noises and pests that
are objectionable on both health and aesthetic grounds.

7

Over the past year I have observed several hearings of the Ontario Municipal
Board and have collected ethnographic information from three of Torontos
four Committees of Adjustment, which grant zoning variances.

8

Field notes, city council committee meeting, 5 February 2005.

9

I have not been able to confirm whether the opening of this shelter was a
direct result of the OMB decision mentioned earlier in the paper, but I
suspect that it wasnt, since the property was already owned by the city,
and there are no residences anywhere near it. Indeed, it seems as if the
OMB decision did not have any

10 See Staff Report from Chief Administrative Officer et al, 13 January 2004.
The figure of 14 is on page 12.
11 While deploying social-work style outreach workers instead of bylaw
enforcement officers to deal with homeless persons face to face, and widely
publicising this carrot approach as compassionate, the city also deployed
a less visible stick: it cut much of the funding it traditionally provided to
civil-society groups (such as Out in the Cold) that had for years handed
out free sandwiches, soup, and toiletry items so as to make it possible for
people to continue living on the streets (Last of the homeless Globe and
Mail 23 July 2005: M1).
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